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We develop a dynamic framework of ideological evolution in a two-trait population of
individuals with perfect foresight. We model how children are educated to a speci¯c
ideological trait, liberal or traditional, which later in life will in°uence their level of
economic activity and therefore the well-being of the family. Our aim is to study the dy-
namics of ideological traits when an exchange matching process takes place. We show
that the ideological distance between groups, namely the taste for similarity within
the family, determines the long-run distribution of traits as well as the intertemporal
parental behaviour in the intergenerational transmission process. Compared to the ex-
isting research on cultural transmission, the singularity of our model appears through
the situation in which parents' paternalism in children's education is a necessary but
not a su±cient condition to guarantee diversity or the preservation of heterogeneity in
the long-run distribution of traits. In particular, our model supports the possibility of
a reversal in the parental evaluation of traits and allow us to understand the changes
in parents' behaviour over time, showing why, in particular contexts, it has changed
from ideologically protective to non-protective. When the opportunity cost of having
children with the same ideology is too high, altruistic parents can behave in a non-
paternalistic way. Assuming myopic agents does not change the qualitative results of
the model; however, paternalism persists for longer than in perfect foresight case.
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11 Introduction
The achievement of social norms, cultural paradigms, religious beliefs and moral customs
is crucial in the characterization of societies. Anthropologists, sociologists and economists
have long been interested in explaining the success of certain groups and the disappearance
of others during their intergenerational evolution1. The groups' a±liation to di®erent ideo-
logical paradigms is another important element that governs individuals' behaviors, because
it determines the intensity of the e®ort made to preserve values in social life.
The concept of ideology is controversial in social science and myriads of de¯nitions have
been given. In this study we consider ideology as the process of implementation and preser-
vation of beliefs, norms, and values in social life by di®erent groups that characterize the
individuals' behaviors2. We are not interested in the process of formation or in the norma-
tive evaluation of di®erent ideologies, but we concentrate on the way in which ideologies are
transmitted through generations, and the inter-temporal evolution of families' socialization
behaviors. These two factors govern the preservation or the disappearance of ideologies in
societies. In our opinion, both the perception of the social relations with members of the
same or di®erent ideological group, and the behaviour of families in the parent-to-children
transmission process, play an important role in explaining the evolution of traits.
History presents several examples of social groups that have remained attached to their
own ideological traits, but also examples of other groups which have gradually accepted the
principles behind di®erent ideological schemes. The Jewish culture is a typical example of
the striking persistence of the con°ict between agents of the same cultural group who have
adopted an orthodox or a moderate paradigm. The con°ict in Waziristan3, the electoral
success of Hamas in the Gaza strip and the Basque and Catalan extremists' claims, give
evidence of the existence of ideological con°icts inside homogeneous ethnic groups.
The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamics of beliefs in a model that combines
ideological and socio-economic factors, showing that diversity (that is a heterogeneous dis-
tribution of traits) is not guaranteed, even though parents are biased towards their own
ideological beliefs. More formally, we want to show that the formal assumption that parents
are willing to have children with the same trait is a necessary but not a su±cient condi-
tion for diversity in the long-run. This, in our opinion, is very important because it allows
1From an anthropological and sociobiological point of view this topic has been studied in the seminal
works of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). In the ¯eld of economics, the
process of intergenerational transmission has been motivated by the evidence of the persistence of cultural
diversity reported by Borjas (1995). Moreover, it has been theoretically modeled by Bisin and Verdier (1998,
2001) with a powerful framework that has been applied in di®erent contexts.
2This de¯nition is close to the formulation established by Hall (1986) who de¯nes ideology as 'the mental
frameworks - the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the system of representation
- which di®erent classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, de¯ne, ¯gure out and render
intelligible the way society works'.
3The Waziristan con°ict is the war between Pakistan and the Waziri tribes, which began in 2004.
2for a reversal of the parental assessment of ideological beliefs during the intergenerational
socialization process. In other words, the framework developed in this paper implies that
diversity must be driven by parental demand for ideological pluralism, but also by the fact
that this demand for pluralism does not necessarily guarantee a heterogeneous distribution
of traits in the long-run.
The basic idea behind our model is that ideology can be viewed as a reliable signal of
the relative trustworthiness of the exchange partners, and it might be conducive to di®erent
social and economic behaviors in society. Given that the value of any social interaction is
determined by the agents' calculation of the costs and rewards of that interaction, people
choose the group that provides them the maximum number of valued rewards and the
smallest costs, that is, the group who share common languages, beliefs, norms, values,
concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation. According to the
social exchange theory4, it can be argued that agents tend to assign higher value to the
exchange when they perceive more cohesiveness and easier interaction, that is, when the
exchange partner shares common values, ideological beliefs and social norms5.
Starting from the main statements of this theory, we develop a dynamic framework of
ideological evolution in a two-trait (traditional and liberal) population of individuals in
which a random matching process takes place. More precisely, agents are randomly engaged
in socio-economic activities modeled in the shape of a trust-matching model. Ideology
is crucially important in our approach because it generates changes in the form of costs
and bene¯ts facing economic actors, thereby inducing changes in matching outcomes. To
capture the idea that people tend to interact with members with the same ideological beliefs,
we assume that the essential variable in the matching process is given by the value that
agents assign to their random match in the society. A match between members of the
same ideological group provides a lower cost or a higher productivity level than a match
between agents with di®ering ideologies. Moreover, traditional agents give greater value to
interactions with people who share their values and social norms because, by de¯nition, they
consider their own roots and ideological beliefs crucially important. We interpret this claim
assuming both that the productivity parameters of a single match between traditional agents
is larger that between liberals, and that only traditional agents face a cost when involved
4Social exchange theory is due to George H. Homans and di®ers from economic exchange theory; it views
the exchange relationship between speci¯c actors as actions contingent on rewarding reactions from others,
(Blau, 1964). One of the main statement of this theory is that social behaviour is an exchange of goods,
material goods, but also non-material ones, such as the symbols of approval or prestige, (Homans, 1958).
Buunk and van Yperen (1991) observe that relation satisfaction also depends on the respective opinions
of partners on the fairness of the relation exchange. Emerson (1976) shows that social exchange theory
is essentially a market economic framework for approaching non-economic phenomena by suggesting that
groups' pressure and members' conformity are to be regarded as the two sides of transactions involving the
exchange of utility or reward.
5Cohesiveness is a value variable; it refers to the degree of reinforcement people ¯nd in the activities of
the group. See Homans (1958)
3in mixed matches.
The process of ideological transmission between generations is related to the literature
on cultural transmission and to the theory of endogenous preferences formation. Following
the basic setup developed by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2001)6, we model how children are
taught to develop a speci¯c ideological trait which later in life will in°uence adult behaviour
in the transmission of traits and the well-being of the family. The socialization process
occurs during childhood through the education channel. Family is the primary agent of
ideological transmission, but school, peers and social institutions also play a fundamental
role in moulding the ideological orientation of individuals7. We assume that all children
are born without de¯ned ideological beliefs and acquire preferences through imitation and
observation of existing ideological models in their social environment. They are ¯rst exposed
to their parents' ideological traits (vertical transmission). If they are not directly socialized,
they adopt the ideology of other adults with whom they are randomly matched in the society
(oblique transmission). Belonging to one ideology rather than another will determine the
matching outcome and, therefore, the welfare of the family.
Parents are assumed to be altruistic and they care about their o®spring's well-being,
which is measured by the utility deriving from the matching process of the child. Moreover,
agents have perfect foresight and rational expectations on the distribution of traits and,
therefore, on children's matching outcomes. In order to capture the parents' desire for ide-
ological homogeneity within the family, we assume that the children's well-being expected
by parents is discounted by a parameter, namely taste for similarity, which can be inter-
preted as the degree of ideological intolerance of parents when children deviate from their
parents' trait, as well as a measure of the relative distance between ideologies8. Whenever
this parameter is positive valued, parents are biased towards their own ideological beliefs.
We will consider two possibilities of parents' behaviour in the education of children: ei-
ther parental preferences are strongly ideology dependent, in the sense that parents make
e®orts to have children with the same ideological traits, implying paternalistic behav-
iour; or parental preferences are weakly ideology dependent, and parents behave in a non-
paternalistic way, in the sense that they maximize the expected well-being of their children,
6The powerful framework developed by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2001), has been applied to di®erent
contexts in the literature, from labor-market discrimination (S¶ aez Mart¶ ³ and Zenou, 2007), to religious
intermarriage and the evolution of ethnic traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, and Bisin et al., 2004), corruption
(Hauk and S¶ aez Mart¶ ³, 2002), identity and integration problems (Bisin et al., 2008) and fertility transition
(Baudin, 2009), to name just a few.
7For instance, several sociological studies suggest that ideological transmission within the family was
one of the factors that kept Basque nationalism active during the Franco dictatorship as well as during the
reinstatement of the republic (see Gatti et al., 2005). In our framework we will assume an inter-generational
model of trait evolution. This approach considers the evolution of ideas that o®spring learn during childhood
from adults (Richerson and Boyd, 1978). This model contrasts with the intra-generational model that applies
to ideas which can spread throughout a population within a single generation (Werren and Pulliman, 1981).
8When a con°ict between ideologies exists, it is more likely that parents with a high taste for similarity
will try to avoid a deviation of children from their own ideological traits.
4disregarding the similarity of their children. More precisely, we say that a society is paternal-
istic when parents of both groups actively promote their own ideological variant. Conversely,
a society is non-paternalistic when parents of both groups agree on the trait that guaran-
tees higher expected well-being, so that parents of one group do not promote their own
trait, leaving the job of children's socialization to peers and oblique transmission. Parents
always promoting their own ideological trait amounts to assume imperfect or degenerate al-
truism. For this reason, in our story, parents' paternalism is endogenously determined and
depends on the trade-o® between protection of the ideology and the objective well-being of
the children.
The main literature on cultural transmission is based on two important assumptions:
¯rst, that the utility to a type-j parent of a type-z child is independent of the distribution
of the ideological traits; second, that parents su®er of a particular form of myopia called
imperfect empathy. These assumptions are crucial in the analysis and imply that parents
always want to turn children into copies of themselves. These models are not able to explain
why, in some situations, parents do not promote their own variant. In fact, '[...] although
there are obvious example of culturally transmitted traits where parents do have an interest
in promoting their own variant, e.g. language, religion, this interest is far less obvious when
it comes to cultural traits and values associated with low status and poor market outcome'
(S¶ aez Mart¶ ³ and SjÄ ogren, 2008). The standard cultural transmission model predicts that
when parental in°uence in their o®spring's education satis¯es imperfect empathy, we observe
paternalism in children's transmission process and diversity in the long-run9. The innovation
in our model appears through the situation in which, despite the fact that paternalistic
behaviour is observed for several periods, the long-run dynamics can converge to conformism,
i.e. a situation in which we observe an homogeneous stationary distribution of ideological
traits. In particular, in our framework paternalism at time t is a necessary but not a su±cient
condition to guarantee the preservation of ideological heterogeneity in the long-run.
This result relies on the fact that parents' paternalism might change over time when the
taste for similarity is su±ciently low. More precisely, when the di®erences between groups'
beliefs are weak, there exists a trade-o® between protection of an ideological paradigm and
exchange level in the matching process, so that a reversal of parental evaluation of the trait
can be observed when the distribution of traits evolves towards the long-run equilibrium.
This mechanism in the intertemporal socialization process allow us to explain why in some
societies the ideological di®erences between groups have gradually disappeared over time,
even when, for some periods, parents tried to protect their own trait by acting as pater-
9Bisin and Verdier (2001) show that as a consequence of imperfect empathy altruistic parents tend to
prefer children with their own trait. This class of socialization mechanisms generates cultural substitutability
and therefore the preservation of cultural heterogeneity.
5nalistic agents. This outcome is due to the fact that when the opportunity cost of having
children with the same beliefs is high, altruistic parents do not promote their own trait, but
behave in a non-paternalistic way. A historical example of this reversal of parental evalu-
ation related to language can be found in Ireland during the XIXth century: many Irish
parents discouraged their children from speaking their native tongue, and encouraged the
use of English instead, because most economic opportunities at that time existed within the
British Empire and the US10. On the other hand, this parent behaviour is not observable
when the di®erences between ideologies are very strong and, therefore, the taste for simi-
larity is su±ciently high. In this case, for instance in the Jewish culture or in the Basque
country, altruistic parents always rationally promote their own ideological variant so that
heterogeneity between ideological groups will persist over time.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we develop a dynamic model of ideological
transmission in which a trust-matching process takes place. Second, we study the dynam-
ics of parents' behaviour in children's education as an endogenous behaviour showing that
paternalism is a necessary but not a su±cient condition to guarantee the preservation of
ideological diversity in the long-run. Third, we compare the dynamics occurring under the
assumption of perfect foresight with those of myopic foresight in order to give robustness to
our results. Our conclusions are presented in the last section.
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations model (OLG) in which each individual lives for two
periods. Total population is normalized to one and is composed of a continuum of agents
with a speci¯cal ideological trait. We model the optimal choice of parents' homogeneity
e®ort in the ideological transmission process when families are composed of one parent and
one child. In particular, we assume that there are two types of agents: traditional, T, and
liberal, L. During the ¯rst period, as a child, the agent is educated in a speci¯c ideological
paradigm. In the second period, as an adult, he or she observes his or her type and randomly
engages in socio-economic activities through a match with another individual. Belonging to
one ideology rather than another will determine the matching outcomes and, therefore, the
families' well-being. We will use the index fj;zg 2 fT;Lg to indicate individual ideological
orientations.
10See Buttimer (2004).
62.1 The Matching Framework
We model socio-economic activity as a trust-matching process in which the trade between
individuals is facilitated when agents share the same ideological behaviour. In this formu-
lation the level of well-being of families is determined by the match between adult agents
belonging to di®erent ideologies, assuming that each individual randomly encounters only
one individual in each period. The essential variable in this matching process is given by
the value that agents assign to their random match in the society. Ideological a±liation
play a crucial role in this process because it can be viewed as a reliable signal of the relative
trustworthiness of the exchange partner. For this reason, a common ideology implies an
easier interaction between agents and provides a lower cost or a higher productivity level
of the social exchange. According to social exchange theory, we assume that the expected
value to one individual of meeting an individual with the same ideology is larger than the
expected value of meeting an individual with a di®erent ideological trait11.
To formalize the idea that people adhering to a speci¯c ideology prefer to encounter
agents who share their values, as well as the fact that traditional agents perceive easier
interaction or higher productivity in traditional relationships12, we assume that the expected
value for a traditional (or liberal) individual of encountering an individual of the same type
is given by ®+¯, (for liberal ®+°), with ¯ > ° > 0, whereas the expected value of meeting
an individual with a di®erent ideology is given by ® > 0 for liberal and ®¡² for traditional
agents, with ® > ² > 0. The parameter ² captures the degree of intolerance of traditional
agents towards liberals and can be view as a psychological cost for traditional individuals in
mixed matches. The larger the parameter ², the more traditional agents are intolerant of a
match with liberal agents. Moreover, we require this cost to be lower than the productivity
gap between traditional and liberal agents in homogeneous matches, i.e. ² < ¯ ¡ °. The
matrix in Table 1 sums up these assumptions and describes the outcomes of the matches
between agents.
Table 1: The matching outcomes
Agents Traditional Liberal
Traditional ® + ¯; ® + ¯ ® ¡ ²; ®
Liberal ®; ® ¡ ² ® + °; ® + °
Let qt 2 [0;1] be the proportion of traditional individuals in the population at time t.
11As shown in Lazear (1999) this is also valid for other cultural elements that characterize social groups.
A common language, for instance, facilitates trade between individuals, because the exchange without
intermediaries produces a level of income higher than when individuals need a translator to negotiate.
12Traditional agents assign higher value to interactions with members of the same ideological variant
because, by de¯nition, they consider the preservation of their own cultural roots and ideological principles
crucially important.
7The expected gains for traditional and liberal agents will be given by:
yT
t = (® + ¯)qt + (® ¡ ²)(1 ¡ qt)
yL
t = ®qt + (® + °)(1 ¡ qt):
The well-being of families will depend on the productivity parameters and on the distrib-
ution of ideologies in the society. It is easy to show that when the proportion of individuals
with di®erent ideologies is the same, the richer group is determined by the values of the
parameters. Whenever the proportion of traditional agents is larger than
²+°
¯+²+° traditional
agents are richer than liberals in welfare terms, and the reverse is true.
2.2 Ideological Transmission, Preferences Evolution and the Taste
for Similarity
In this section we develop an economic model of ideology evolution in a two-trait population
of individuals. It explains how children are educated to a speci¯c trait which later in life
will in°uence their adult behaviour and family's well-being. We will draw from the model
of cultural transmission developed by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), and formalized by
Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2001). We assume that all children are born without de¯ned ide-
ology and acquire preferences through the imitation and observation of existing ideological
paradigms in their social environment. They are ¯rst exposed to their parents' ideological
trait (vertical transmission), which they adopt with probability ¿
j
t with j 2 fT;Lg13. With
probability 1 ¡ ¿
j
t a child from a family with ideology j is not directly socialized and he or
she adopts, via imitation and learning, the ideology of other adults he or she is randomly
matched with (oblique transmission)14. The ideology transmission process takes place in
childhood; however ideology is an important determinant of family well-being during adult-
hood when the matching process takes place.
Parents are assumed to be altruistic and they care about their o®spring well-being, which
is measured by the future expected utility perceived by parents at time t. We relax two
important assumptions of the main literature on cultural transmission: ¯rst, that the utility
to a type-j parent of a type-z child is independent of the distribution of the ideological traits;
13We observe that ¿
j
t also represents the ideological homogeneity e®ort made by a parent with orientation
j to socialize the child to the same ideological trait.
14For an exhaustive discussion on vertical and oblique transmission see Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2001)
8second, that parents su®er of a particular form of myopia called imperfect empathy15. These
assumptions are crucial in the analysis and entail parents always wanting to socialize their
children to their own cultural traits.
In our model parents have perfect foresight, so that in the period t they have rational
expectations about the distribution of ideologies in the next period, t + 1. The assumption





parents know their children's future matching outcomes y
j
t+1
16. In order to capture the role
of ideological orientation, we assume that children's well-being expected by parents at time
t is discounted by a parameter, d 2 [0;1], namely the taste for similarity within the family17.
This parameter can be interpreted as the degree of ideological intolerance of parents when
children deviate from their own trait, or as a measure of the relative distance between
ideologies. When a con°ict between ideologies exists, it seems reasonable to assume that
parents are less willing for their children to deviate from their own ideological trait. Parents
are always biased towards children's ideology, so that they evaluate the income the child
will obtain taking into account the intensity of the taste for similarity within the family,




t+1(1 ¡ d) with 0 < d < 1.
Let P
jz
t de¯ne the probability that the child of a parent with ideology j will adopt













t = (1 ¡ ¿
j
t )(1 ¡ q
j
t): (2)
The fraction of agents adhering to ideology j in period t+1, will be given by the following













15In the literature, the hypothesis of imperfect empathy implies that parents are always paternalistic and
willing to have children with their own ideology. The justi¯cation of imperfect empathy from an evolutionary
perspective is provided in some empirical studies, as discussed by Bisin and Verdier (2001). On the other
hand, for reasons discussed in the introduction, in our formulation paternalistic behaviour is not assumed
as given but is endogenously determined.
16In Section 4 we prove that if parents have myopic foresight the main results do not change. Assuming
parents with myopic foresight implies the same qualitative dynamic of ideological traits and the same long-
run equilibrium, but a lower speed of convergence towards the stable equilibria compared to the model with
perfect foresight. See Section 4 for more details.
17To simplify, we will assume that the taste for similarity is the same for parents displaying both ideological
traits.
18By the law of large numbers P
jz
i also denotes the fraction of children with a type-j parent who adopt
type-z ideology (see Bisin and Verdier, 1998, 2001).
9Parents are altruistic and make e®orts to maximize their children's expected well-being.






































where xt is consumption at time t and C(¿
j
t ) denote the cost of the ideological homogeneity












t are the expected utilities a parent of type j attributes to the
welfare of his or her child. By assumption, utility is linear and ^ ye
t+1 = ye
t+1(1 ¡ d) with
0 < d < 1.
Let j = T and z = L; as before qt represents the proportion of traditional agents in the
population. We de¯ne the utility relative gains that parents perceive from the ideological
transmission process, taking into account their own ideological trait, with the following
equations:
¢V T
t ´ V TT
t (y
e;T
t+1) ¡ V TL
t (^ y
e;L
t+1) = qt+1[(¯ + ²) + °(1 ¡ d)] ¡ (² + °) + d(® + °) (5)
¢V L
t ´ V LL
t (y
e;L
t+1) ¡ V LT
t (^ y
e;T
t+1) = qt+1[(¯ + ²)(d ¡ 1) ¡ °] + ²(1 ¡ d) + (d® + °): (6)
Depending on these utility gains and on the productivity parameters in the social ex-
change, we can have two kinds of parental behaviour in children's education: either parental
preferences are 'strongly ideology dependent', in the sense that parents prefer to have chil-
dren of the same ideological trait, or parental preferences are 'weakly ideology dependent',
in the sense that parents are not willing to promote their speci¯c trait. In particular, when-
ever both ¢V T
t > 0 and ¢V L
t > 0, all parents want to socialize their children to their own
ideological trait and make positive e®ort in vertical transmission process. We de¯ne this
behaviour as paternalism. Conversely, when one of the two utility gains is non-positive,
some parents do not actively promote their own ideological variant inside the family. We
refer to this behaviour as non-paternalism20.
Maximizing (4) with respect to ¿T
t and ¿L
t we obtain the following ¯rst order conditions:
19It is possible to obtain similar results with any increasing and convex cost function.
20In the non-paternalistic scenario we consider that one of the two utility gains is zero. We exclude







































Di®erentiating the transitional probabilities (1) and (2), we derive the optimal ideological





















The e®ect of the current distribution on parents' behaviour depends whether or not di-
rect vertical socialization acts as a substitute or as a complement to oblique socialization.
When vertical transmission acts as a cultural substitutes to oblique transmission, the e®ort
of the parents is a strictly decreasing function of the size of their own ideological group.
This means that the smaller group tends to socialize their children more intensely than the
dominant group. When vertical and oblique transmission are complements, parents' e®ort
is a strictly increasing function of the size. In this case the dominant group socialize their
children more intensely21. The impact of the taste for similarity on the socialization e®ort
is strictly positive for both types of agents, whereas the e®ect of ² is negative for traditional
parents and ambiguous for liberal agents because it depends on the parameters and initial
distribution of traits.
2.3 The Dynamics of Ideological Traits
The main literature on cultural transmission assumes that parents, while altruistic, are also
paternalistic as a consequence of the imperfect empathy assumption. For this reason they
prefer children with their own cultural traits and hence make positive e®orts to socialize
them into these traits22.
21See Bisin and Verdier (2001) for an exhaustive discussion of substitutability and complementarity be-
tween the two transmission channels. They show that if vertical and oblique transmission are substitutes
for both groups, the dynamics will converge to heterogeneous distribution of cultural traits.
22The fact that parents try to actively promote their own traits is well documented in the literature. The
evidence of the persistence of ethnic, cultural and religious traits across generations motivates a large part of
the literature on intergenerational transmission (see for instance Borjas, 1995; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009).
In a recent study of fertility transition Baudin (2009), shows that agents who are more attached to their
culture are less sensitive to asymmetric technological shocks and, therefore, make more e®orts to help their
11Bisin and Verdier (2008) state that 'given imperfect empathy on the parts of parents,
¢V i > 0. [...] It is straightforward to demonstrate that this class of socialization mecha-
nisms generates cultural substitutability and therefore the preservation of long-run hetero-
geneity'23. In particular, when both parents are intolerant of their children's deviations from
their own trait, i.e. ¢V T
t > 0 and ¢V L
t > 0, the long-run equilibrium will be characterized
by diversity or ideological heterogeneity in the distribution of traits24.
In this section we are interested in showing under what conditions our model is conducive
to diversity in the long-run25. To this end we study the dynamics of ideological traits within
groups, assuming that the parents are altruistic and have perfect foresight, plus a positive
taste for similarity in the ideological transmission process. As before, we de¯ne qt as the
proportion of traditional agents. Substituting (5) and (6) into (9) and (10), using (3), after
some algebraical manipulation, we determine the dynamics of the distribution of traditional
traits in the population as:
qt+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
qtf1+°[d(1¡qt)¡1](1¡qt)+®d(1¡qt)(1¡2qt)¡²(1¡qt)(1¡dqt)g
1+(1¡qt)qt[d(¯+²¡°)qt¡°(1¡d)¡¯¡²] if ¢V T










t = 0;¢V L
t > 0
(11)
The asymptotic behaviour of our dynamic system depends upon the number of steady
states that our dynamic equation possess which are admissible in the domain . Eliminating
the temporal index and solving for the proportion of traditional parents, we observe that
the dynamics always present at least two steady states admissible in the domain, ¹ q = 0 and
¹ q = 1, which are stable for d <
°+²
°+® and d ·
¯
®+¯ respectively.




®+¯ and a critical value e¤ =
®(¯¡°)
®+¯ . Diversity is observed in the long-run:
(i) when ² < ²¤, 8 0 < q0 < 1 i® d > d2.
(ii) when ² > ²¤, 8 ¹ qI¡ < q0 < 1 i® d > d2.
(iii) when ² = ²¤, 8 0 < q0 < 1 i® d > d¤ = d1 = d2.
culture survive.
23Bisin and Verdier (2001) show other micro-founded speci¯cations in which cultural complementarity
and tendency of cultural homogenization over time is observed.
24Conversely, cultural transmission mechanisms with perfect empathy imply dynamics of the distribution
of traits which converge to degenerate distributions or conformism, that is, cultural homogenization in the
long-run.
25In our framework it is important to understand that the ideological trait adopted by the child is expected
to a®ect the child's welfare welfare in adult life. Parents have perfect foresight and care about their children's
welfare, but they are also biased about the ideological orientation the children adopt because d > 0.
12Proof. See Appendix.
¥
In general, we claim that in our model diversity is ensured in the long-run when the taste
for similarity (d) is su±ciently high. When this is not the case the dynamics might present
multiple equlibria, so that the long-run distribution will depend on the initial distribution
and on the value of the taste for similarity and the parameters. Interestingly enough,
imperfect empathy is observed when the taste for similarity is su±ciently high. This means
that at every period the type of empathy is endogenously determined.















∆V T = 0
∆V L = 0
In order to state the proposition 1, let us de¯ne the r.h.s. of our dynamic equation
(11) as f(qt). Firstly, assume that ¢V i





®+¯ = d2 (see Figure 1)26. The limit of
f(qt)
qt when q ! 0 is given by
1 + ®d ¡ °(1 ¡ d). When d > d1 this limit is grater than 1. This means that the function
f(qt) passes above the 45± line as q tends towards zero. Solving (11) at the equilibrium
we always ¯nd three steady states admissible in the domain except when d 2 [d1;d2]. If




2d(¯¡°) belongs to the domain and is always
stable and smaller than 127. In this case, for any initial 0 < q0 < 1 the trajectory converges
26The shaded area represents the situation in which both parents actively promote their ideological traits,
¢V i
t > 0 8i 2 fT;Lg, that is they are paternalistic in their children trait transmission. We will discuss in
Section 3 the inter-temporal behaviour of parents in their children's education.
27With ¤ = f¯+²+d[²¡2(®+°)]+°g2 +4d(¯+²¡°)[®d¡²+°(d¡1)]. Since ² < ¯¡° by assumption,
13to the stable interior solution. When d < d1 the solution admissible in the domain is given




2d(¯¡°) . Since the limit of
f(qt)
qt when q ! 0 is smaller than
1, the trajectory converges to the origin, passing below the 45± line. This implies that the
interior solution ¹ qI¡ is unstable. For any initial 0 < q0 < 1 we have multiple equilibria
and the trajectory converges to the origin whenever q0 < ¹ qI¡, and to 1 whenever q0 > ¹ qI¡.
Note that in this case ¹ qI¡ is always smaller than
°+²
¯+°+². When d 2 [d1;d2] the dynamic
only allows the two trivial steady states admissible in the domain and the system always
converges to the stationary steady state ¹ q = 1. When ¢V T
t = 0, the long-run dynamics do
not change, since the non-trivial solution admissible in the domain ¹ qIT =
®d+²(1¡d)+°
(1¡d)(¯+²)+° is
always unstable. Similarly, when ¢V L
t = 0, then ¹ qIL =
²+°¡d(®+°)
¯+²+°(1¡d) is always unstable.












¯ qI− ¯ qI−
¯ qI+ ∆V L = 0
∆V T = 0




®+¯ = d2 (see Figure 2). As before,
when the taste for similarity is su±ciently high, d ¸ d1, and for any initial 0 < q0 < 1, the
trajectory will converge to the stable interior solution in which diversity of ideological traits
is observed. When d 2]d2;d1[ a multiplicity of equilibria appear and the long-run solution
will depend on the initial distribution of traits. In particular if q0 > ¹ qI¡ then diversity will
be observed; however if q0 < ¹ qI¡ the dynamics will converge to a homogeneous distribution
of ideological traits. When d · d2, for any initial 0 < q0 < 1 we have multiple equilibria
and the trajectory converges to the origin whenever q0 < ¹ qI¡, and to 1 whenever q0 > ¹ qI¡.
The case in which the cost for traditional agents in mixed matches equals its critical level
² = ²¤ and, consequently d1 = d2 = d¤, is characterized by only two possible situations.
¤ > 0. See the Proof 1 for more details.
14Whenever the taste for similarity is su±ciently high, d > d¤, the system converges to
the stable internal solution. If this is not the case, the dynamic depends on the initial
distribution of the ideological traits, and a multiplicity of equilibria appear.
From Figures 1 and 2 we can observe that our model presents two bifurcation points, in
which two ¯xed points change their stability proprieties from stable to unstable and vicev-
ersa. This kind of dynamics, namely transcritical bifurcation, happens when four conditions
are satis¯ed. A precise de¯nition of transcritical bifurcation is useful.
De¯nition (Transcritical Bifurcation): Let ^ d be a value of the parameter d, and ¹ q
be a non-hyperbolic steady state of the dynamic qt+1 = f(qt;d). If the following conditions
are satis¯ed:
² (i) f(¹ q; ^ d) = ¹ q;
² (ii)
@f








@q2 (¹ q; ^ d) 6= 0
then the dynamic system qt+1 = f(qt;d) undergoes a transcritical bifurcation where the equi-
libria pass through each other.
Proposition 2. For parameters d = fd1; d2g the steady state ¹ q is a non-hyperbolic steady
state. Our dynamic system undergoes a transcritical bifurcation and presents two bifurcation
points in which one equilibrium collides with another and the two equilibria exchange their
stability proprieties, but continue to exist both before and after the bifurcation.
Proof. See Appendix.
¥
A bifurcation occurs at d = d1 where the steady state ¹ q = 0 changes its stability pro-
prieties. In particular, the trivial steady state ¹ q = 0 changes its proprieties from stable, for
d < d1, to unstable, for d ¸ d1. A bifurcation also occurs at d = d2. At this point the trivial
steady state ¹ q = 1 changes its proprieties from stable, for d · d2, to unstable, for d > d2
28.
28The non-trivial steady states admissible in the domain, ¹ qI¡ and ¹ qI+, change their stability proprieties
at these values of d.
153 When Paternalism is not conducive to Heterogeneous
Distribution of Traits
The assumption of imperfect empathy is commonly interpreted as a form of myopic or
paternalistic altruism. As a consequence parents, while altruistic, want to have children
with the same ideological trait. They evaluate the future welfare of their children only
through the ¯lter of their own preferences, that is, they behave in a paternalistic way. For
this reason they always prefer children with their own ideological traits. In our framework
parents' paternalism is not taken as given but is endogenously determined and depends
on the trade-o® between the protection of ideological traits and the exchange level in the
matching process. More precisely, our model is consistent with both the evidence that
families try to have children of the same type, and the fact that parents care about the
possible consequences for their children's well-being. The combination of the intensity of
the taste for similarity and matching outcomes will determine the opportunity cost of trait
preservation and, thereby, the parents' behaviour in the ideological transmission process.
One of the reasons behind our formulation is, as we know, that parents try to actively
promote their own traits. But the fact that parents in some particular situations, for
instance in disadvantaged environments, continue to promote their own ideological traits
at the expense of a higher well-being is not convincing and appears counterintuitive, in
particular when parents seem not care too much about their children's ideological values.
In our opinion, situations in which altruistic parents do not evaluate the consequences of
their actions on their children's well-being are more likely when the desire for ideological
homogenization within the family plays a crucial role in the transmission process, that is,
when the taste for similarity is su±ciently high. Parents always promoting their own traits
amounts to assuming imperfect or degenerate altruism.
Compared to the existing literature, our model yields two new results. First, parents'
paternalism at time t is a necessary but not a su±cient condition to ensure diversity in
the long-run. Second, parents' behaviour in the preference transmission process can change
over time when the dynamics converge to the long-run equilibrium. Our approach could
explain why some groups adhering to a speci¯c ideological paradigm have changed their
approach to children's education during their intergenerational evolution. Our model is
able to reproduce historical events in which a reversal of parents' evaluation of a trait has
been observed. An example of this reversal of behaviour in children's education is the decline
of the Irish language in the XIXth century: during the Great Famine many Irish parents
discouraged their children from speaking Irish, and encouraged the use of English instead29.
29See Buttimer (2004).
16The reason behind this behaviour can be found in the economic opportunities related to the
use of English, seen as the only way to a better life30.
The intuition related to this outcome is that, when the distance between ideological par-
adigms is not too great, there is a trade-o® between the taste for similarity and children's
expected well-being, which may induce parents not to promote their variant even though
their are biased towards their own ideological beliefs31.
Proposition 3. Paternalism at time t is a necessary but not a su±cient condition to
guarantee diversity in the long-run.
(i) Assume ² · ²¤: if d · d2 (conformism) and q0 is such that ¢V i
0 > 0 with i = fT;Lg,
then paternalism disappears over time; if d > d2 (diversity) then paternalism is observed at
every t 8 0 < q0 < 1.
(ii) Assume ² > ²¤: if d · d2 (conformism) and q0 is such that ¢V i
0 > 0 with i = fT;Lg,
then paternalism disappears over time; if d 2]d2;d1] paternalism disappears only if q0 < ¹ qI¡
(conformism); if q0 > ¹ qI¡ (diversity) paternalism is observed at every t; if d > d1 (diversity)
then paternalism is observed at every t 8 0 < q0 < 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
¥
Our results are a direct consequence of the assumptions that the utility to a type-j
altruistic parent of a type-z child depends upon the distribution of ideological traits, and
that parents' behaviour in children's socialization is driven by what we have called taste
for similarity. For this reason, the contribution of this paper contrasts with the standard
result in the literature in which it is shown that paternalism is a necessary and su±cient
condition to ensure diversity in the long-run, but also with the result in which it is shown
that paternalism in neither a necessary, nor a su±cient condition for diversity32.
When there are di®erences between ideologies parameter d should be positively valued in
our model and, in particular, the larger the di®erences between ideological beliefs, the higher
the taste for similarity. However, given qt, when d is large enough to lead to a paternalistic
society, i.e. d is such that both ¢V T
t > 0 and ¢V L
t > 0, but not su±ciently large to
lead to diversity in the long-run, then paternalistic behaviour at time t, does not guarantee
30Think for instance of the importance of the English language as the language of survival in the migrant's
choices from Ireland to the British Empire or US.
31For instance, during the XIXth century, Irish political leaders, such as Daniel O'Connell were critical
of the Irish language, seing it as "backward", with English the language of the future.
32S¶ aez Mart¶ ³ and SjÄ ogren (2008) observe that under demand for pluralism, i.e. ¢V i > 0, the standard
result in the literature (namely that if parents promote their own trait and oblique transmission is linear,
diversity is guaranteed) is con¯rmed. Assuming that oblique transmission is biased or frequency dependents
implies that paternalism in neither a necessary, nor a su±cient condition for diversity.
17heterogeneity, because the opportunity cost of preserving the group's ideology increases with
the size of the other group and therefore with the outcome of the matching process. In other
words when the taste for similarity is su±ciently low, there exists a trade-o® between the
protection of traits and future children's well-being.
Assume for simplicity ² = ²¤. Con°ict between ideologies implies a high taste for simi-
larity and, thereby, strong protection of trait in the ideological transmission process, so that
we can assume d > d¤, with d¤ = d1 = d2. In this speci¯c case, parents are paternalistic
at every t ¸ 0 and both groups strive to protect their own variant, so that diversity is
ensured in the long-run distribution. Only in this particular situation we observe imperfect
empathy at every period of the intergenerational evolution of the families. For instance, in
Jewish cultures traditional and liberal agents have never assimilated but continue to coexist.
Traditional parents attribute great value to children's ideology and make strong e®orts to
promote their own trait. Liberal parents also prefer to have children of the same type, be-
cause they consider the traditional group too conservative with respect to their ideological
paradigm. Given the fact that both types of parents exhibit a high taste for similarity, it
is not surprising that the model predicts the persistence of ideological heterogeneity in the
long-run.
On the other hand, when di®erences between ideologies are not important, parents are
more interested in their children's market outcomes than the promotion of their own ide-
ological variant. This is the case in which parents have a low taste for similarity in the
model, i.e. d < d¤. The long-run equilibrium will depend on the initial distribution of ide-
ologies and will converge to the equilibrium characterized by conformism or a homogeneous
stationary distribution of traits. This parental behaviour in the transmission of traits may
also explain why in some societies ideological di®erences between groups have disappeared
over time, even though in some periods parents wanted to protect their own traits by acting
as paternalistic agents. Think for instance of the history of the main Protestant countries
of northern Europe. Parental paternalism towards di®erent beliefs was strong for several
centuries but more recently has become less protective and has gradually disappeared. The
increasing size of the Protestant group as well as the in°uence of Protestant institutions
has led to the acceptance of many basic Protestant principles, such as the attitude towards
thrift and economic status. More precisely, the trade-o® between protection of ideological
traits and future children's well-being has discouraged parents from promoting their own
ideological beliefs.
In order to give a numerical example we set the following values for parameters and
initial condition on the distribution of the ideological traits: ® = 0:7, ¯ = 0:8, ° = 0:5,
q0 = 0:3, and ² = ²¤ = 0:14, so that d¤ = 0:533. As shown in Table 2, when the level
18Table 2: Paternalism versus diversity
d = 0:3 d = 0:8
time ¢V T ¢V L q ¢V T ¢V L q
0 0.08 0.48 0.30 0.68 0.85 0.30
1 0.05 0.51 0.28 0.73 0.82 0.35
2 0.03 0.53 0.26 0.76 0.79 0.39
3 0 0.56 0.24 0.80 0.77 0.43
4 0 0.59 0.21 0.82 0.75 0.46
5 0 0.63 0.18 0.84 0.74 0.48
6 0 0.66 0.15 0.86 0.73 0.50
1 0 0.81 0 0.91 0.70 0.56
of the taste for similarity is below the threshold that guarantees diversity in the long-run,
paternalistic behaviour, i.e. ¢V i > 0 with i = fT;Lg can evolve over time as the ideological
trait changes. Consider for instance, d = 0:3: if we look at the trends in intergenerational
behaviour as the dynamics converge to the stable steady state, we see that after 3 periods
of time, traditional parents will behave in a non-paternalistic way and not promote their
own trait to their children. Since ¿T
t = ¢V T
t (1 ¡ qt), when traditional parents are not pa-
ternalistic ¢V T = 0, they will not make any e®ort to have children of the same type. This
outcome is a consequence of the fact that the opportunity cost of having children with the
same ideology modi¯es parents' behaviour in the intergenerational transmission process. In
particular parents give more weight to their children's well-being than to promoting their
own ideological variant, that is, they behave in a non paternalistic way. In this example
the traditional trait will disappear in the long-run since the size of this group will decrease
monotonically as will the probability of socialization to this trait via oblique transmission.
On the other hand, this behaviour is not observable when the di®erences between ideologies
are very strong, as for instance in Catalonia or the Basque Country, and therefore the taste
for similarity is su±ciently high. In this case we set d = 0:8, so that altruistic parents always
promote their own ideological variant, imperfect empathy is observed in every period, and
the long-run dynamics converge to the stationary solution in which diversity appears, as
suggested in the main literature on cultural transmission.
194 Robustness of the Model: Parents with Myopic Fore-
sight
In the section we relax the assumption of rational expectations in order to give robustness
to the model presented above. Our aim is to compare the dynamics occurring under the
assumption of perfect foresight with those of myopic foresight33. When parents have myopic
foresight they cannot formulate rational expectations about the future distribution of traits
in the population, so they evaluate their children's well-being using their own payo® matrix




t, with j = fT;Lg34.
Let us consider the dynamics of the proportion of traditional agents, j = T. Substituting




t into the utility gains (5) and (6) and into the
parents' optimal e®orts (9) and (10), from equation (3) we derive the dynamics of the
distribution of traditional trait in the population:
qt+1 = qt+(1¡qt)qtf(®+°)d¡(²+°)+[¯+®+d(²¡2®¡2°)+°]qt¡d(¯+²¡°)q2
tg: (12)
Eliminating the temporal index and solving for the proportion of traditional agents in
the population we ¯nd the same long-run equilibria as in the model with perfect foresight.
Proposition 4. Assume myopic foresight expectations on ideologies' distribution in the




t. The dynamic under myopic foresight exhibits a lower speed
of convergence towards the long-run equilibrium but the same qualitative structure of the
dynamic under perfect foresight, in the sense that the steady states are the same and the
¯rst-order stability conditions are equivalent.
Proof. See Appendix.
¥
Although the two models have the same qualitative dynamics, one important di®erence
is that the dynamic under perfect foresight has a higher speed of convergence towards the
stable steady states. This means that, under rational expectations, the long-run equilib-
rium is reached more quickly, because parents can perfectly anticipate the children's future
well being and choose optimally their e®ort in the ideological transmission process. The
intuition behind this result is that in the myopic foresight case parents do not predict that
33Michel and de la Croix (2000) compare myopic and perfect foresight dynamics in a standard OLG model,
showing that when both dynamics are monotonic, the steady states are the same.
34As before, the expected children's income should be discounted by the level of the taste for similarity
within the family, since parents' utility depends on children's ideological orientation.
20the distribution of trait will be di®erent tomorrow.
To give a numerical example, let us consider an economy with the following productivity
parameters in the matching process: ® = 0:7;¯ = 0:8;° = 0:5 and assume that the initial
proportion of traditional agents is 30% of total population. Given these parameter values we
observe ²¤ = 0:14. Assuming ² = ²¤ we have d¤ = 0:533. From the simulation presented in
Table 3, we observe as in perfect foresight case, that the dynamic quickly converges towards
its stationary steady state35.
Table 3: Convergence of qt
Perfect foresight Myopic foresight
taste
time d < d¤ d > d¤ d < d¤ d > d¤
0 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
1 0.381 0.445 0.387 0.436
2 0.353 0.476 0.371 0.464
3 0.315 0.497 0.350 0.484
4 0.264 0.511 0.323 0.499
5 0.202 0.520 0.289 0.510
6 0.137 0.526 0.248 0.517
7 0.081 0.530 0.201 0.523
1 0 0.537 0 0.537
Under the myopic foresight assumption, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are still valid and their
analytical tractability is easier than in the case with perfect foresight. With myopic foresight,
when a reversal of parents' educational strategy is observed, paternalism persists for longer
than in the perfect foresight case. This result is a consequence of the optimal e®ort chosen
by parents when transmitting vertically their own ideological beliefs. In particular, the
protection of the trait is greater (lower) in the perfect foresight case as the dynamic tends
towards the long-run equilibrium in which the distribution of traits is characterized by an
increase (decrease) in the group's size. As in the perfect foresight case, paternalism a time
t is not a su±cient condition to guarantee diversity in the long-run36.
35As before we assume d = 0:3 and d = 0:8.
36At the same time it is straightforward to demonstrate that non-paternalism is a su±cient but not a
necessary condition to ensure conformism in the long-run.
215 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed how a±liation to ideological paradigms interacts with agents'
inter-generational behaviour in the process of children's traits transmission and well-being
production. We considered a model of trait transmission assuming altruistic agents with
perfect foresight who care about both their o®spring's welfare, and having children with
the same ideological orientation as themselves. In our framework we supposed the existence
of an exchange social market in which a random matching process takes place, modeled in
the shape of mutual trust. Trait distribution and ideological a±liation to a traditional or
a liberal paradigm determines the level of matching outcomes and therefore the family's
well-being. We also assumed that parents are biased about children's traits according to
their taste for similarity. This de¯nes the intensity of their e®orts to preserve the ideological
orientation within the family. This parameter can alternatively be interpreted as the distance
or the degree of con°ict between ideologies.
The result of the main literature on cultural transmission for which imperfect empathy
generates cultural substitutability and therefore the preservation of long-run heterogeneity,
appears only if the taste for similarity is su±ciently high. When this is not the case, our
model supports the possibility of a reversal in the parental evaluation of traits; in particular
parents in disadvantaged environments would not actively promote their own trait if it was
conducive to a poor future for their children.
Our framework describes the parents' paternalistic behaviour as an endogenous behav-
iour, that is driven by the trade-o® between the preservation of the ideological trait and the
social exchange level in the matching process. The fact that paternalism in not exogenously
determined allow us to understand the changes in parents' behaviour over time, showing
why, in particular contexts, it has changed from ideologically protective to non-protective.
When the opportunity cost of having children with the same ideology is too high, altruistic
parents can behave in a non-paternalistic way. Contrary to the standard model, our theory
can explain why some ideological traits become extinct, even though parents was willing to
actively promote them for several periods of time.
Finally we tested the robustness of the model assuming myopic foresight. We obtained
the same qualitative results as with the benchmark model even though the speed of conver-
gence towards the long-run equilibrium is faster in the perfect foresight case. This is due to
the fact that myopic parents do not realize that the distribution of traits may be di®erent
tomorrow. Moreover, paternalism persists for longer than in perfect foresight case.
A natural extension is to assume a heterogeneous distribution of the taste for similarity
between groups and explore the e®ect on the dynamics of traits and on the dynamics of
paternalism in the socialization process.
22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let qt+1 = f(qt;d) be function (11) de¯ned on the interval J 2 [0;1] of <. In order to prove
Proposition 1 we have to study the stability of the steady states of this dynamic function in
three di®erent cases. First we observe that when a steady state is hyperbolic, we can study
its stability on the basis of its ¯rst derivative. Let ¹ q be a steady state 2 J. We say that ¹ q
is hyperbolic if jf
0
(¹ q)j 6= 1; when jf
0
(¹ q)j < 1 then ¹ q is locally stable; when jf
0
(¹ q)j > 1 then
¹ q is unstable.
Assume ¯rst that ¢V i
t > 0 8 i 2 fT;Lg. Eliminating the temporal index in the dynamic
equation and solving for the proportion of traditional families, we ¯nd four steady states,
¹ q = f0;1; ¹ qI¡; ¹ qI+g that can be admissible in the domain depending on the parameters, the
initial distribution of traits and the taste for similarity.
We de¯ne d1 =
°+²
®+° and d2 =
¯
®+¯. Assume ¹ q = 0. When jf
0
(0)j = 1 + ®d ¡ ² ¡ (1 ¡ d)°,
it is straightforward to prove that the trivial steady state ¹ q = 0 is hyperbolic for d 6= d1.
Furthermore ¹ q = 0 is stable (i.e. jf
0
(0)j < 1) if d < d1, and unstable (i.e. jf
0
(0)j > 1) if
d > d1. Assume now ¹ q = 1. In this case non-hyperbolicity arises if and only if d = d2,
because jf
0
(1)j = 1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ d) + ®d. It is easy to show that ¹ q = 1 is stable for d < d2 and
unstable for d > d2.
When d < d1 the solution ¹ qI¡ is always admissible in the domain q 2 [0;1]. Nonetheless,
this steady state is always unstable because jf
0
(¹ qI¡)j > 1 8 d < d1. Conversely, the other
non-trivial solution, ¹ qI+, is admissible in the domain, and is stable, if and only if d > d2.
This steady state is always stable since jf
0
(¹ qI+)j < 1 8 d > d2.
If we assume ¢V T
t = 0 (resp. ¢V L
t = 0), then the dynamic presents only one non trivial
solution, ¹ qIT =
®d+²(1¡d)+°
(1¡d)(¯+²)+° (resp. ¹ qIL
²+°¡d(®+°)
¯+²+°(1¡d)) that is admissible in the domain if
and only if d < d1 (resp. d < d2). This non trivial solution is always unstable because
jf
0
(¹ qIT)j > 1 (resp. jf
0
(¹ qIL)j > 1). Moreover we can observe that ¹ qIL < ¹ qI¡ 8 d 6= f0;d1g.
When ¢V T
t = 0 (resp ¢V L
t = 0), the dynamics will converge to the steady state ¹ q = 0
(resp. ¹ q = 1) that is always stable since jf
0
(0)j < 1 (resp jf
0
(1)j < 1).
Given the parameters' domain three scenarios are possible depending on the value of ². (i)
When ² < ²¤ it follows that d1 < d2. In this speci¯c case if d 2 [d1;d2] only the two trivial
solutions are admissible in the domain q 2 [0;1] and the long-run dynamic always converges
to the trivial steady state ¹ q = 1. If d > d2 then qt ! ¹ qI+. If d < d1 we have multiplicity
of equilibria and the long-run distribution depends on the initial trait distribution q0. (ii)
When ² > ²¤ we observe d1 > d2. If d 2]d2;d1[ the two non-trivial solutions are both ad-
missible in the domain. In particular ¹ qI¡ is unstable (since d < d1) and ¹ qI+ is stable (since
23d > d2). The long-run dynamic will depend on the initial conditions of the distribution of
traits in the population. (iii) When ² = ²¤, then d1 = d2 = d¤; 8 d 6= fd¤g at least one
of the two non-trivial solutions is admissible in the domain. In particular ¹ qI¡ is admissible
if d < d¤ and it is always unstable 8 qt 2 [0;1]. On the other hand, ¹ qI+ is admissible but
always stable if d > d¤ 8 qt 2 [0;1].
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume ¯rst that ¢V i
t > 0 8 i 2 fT;Lg. Let us the r.h.s. of equation (11) as f(qt;d). As
already shown in Proof 1, we ¯nd two non-hyperbolic steady states, ¹ q = 0 and ¹ q = 1, that
arise for d = d1 =
°+²
®+° and d = d2 =
¯
®+¯ respectively. In order to prove that our dynamical
system undergoes a transcritical bifurcation, we have to show that the four conditions for
this type of bifurcation are satis¯ed at these equilibrium points.
Consider the non-hyperbolic steady state ¹ q = 0 with d = d1. Substituting these values
into the equation f(qt;d), conditions (i) and (ii) follow immediately since f(0;d1) = 0 and
@f
@d(0;d1) = 0. Conditions (iii) and (iv) are also satis¯ed because
@
2f




@q2 (0;d1) = 2¯ ¡
2(®¡²+°)(²+°)
®+° , which is always positive given the assumption on
parameters.
Consider now the other non-hyperbolic steady state ¹ q = 1 with d = d2. As before all the four
conditions are satis¯ed, since (i) f(1;d2) = 1, (ii)
@f
@d(0;d2) = 0, (iii)
@
2f




@q2 (1;d2) = 2(¯ ¡ °) ¡ 2®²
®+¯, which is always positive given the assumption on
parameters. The same results arise when ¢V T
t > 0 and ¢V L
t = 0 or when ¢V T
t = 0 and
¢V L
t > 0.
Since all the conditions are satis¯ed and ¹ q = f0;1g yields a non-hyperbolic steady state for
d = fd1;d2g, we conclude that our dynamical system undergoes a transcritical bifurcation.
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to prove Proposition 3, we start by showing the conditions under which we have
paternalism, that is both ¢V T
0 and ¢V L
0 are positive at t = 0. ¢V T







1+(1¡(q0))q0[d(¯¡°+²)q0¡(¯+°+²)+d°] > 0. The dominator
is always positive; the numerator is a parabola which is positive if and only if parameter




½T) with ±T =
2®q2






0 > 0 if and only
if q0 is such that
(1¡d)²(1¡q0)+°(q0¡1)[¯(d¡2)dq0(q0¡1)¡1]+®d[1+(d¡2)(¯+°+²)(1¡q0)
2q0]
1+(1¡(q0))q0[d(¯¡°+²)q0¡(¯+°+²)+d°] > 0. The
dominator is always positive; the numerator is once again a parabola which is positive if and
only if parameter d and the q0 are such that 1 > d > ^ dL(q0) ´ 1
2[¯°+®(¯+°+²)]q0(q0¡1)2(±L ¡
p
½L) with ±L = ²(1 ¡ q0) + ¯[2°(q0 ¡ 1)2 ¡ 1]q0 + ®[2(¯ + ² + °)(q0 ¡ 1)2q0 ¡ 1] and
½L = 4[¯° + ®(¯ + ° + ²)](q0 ¡ 1)2q0[(¯ + ² + °)q0 ¡ (² + °)] + f²(1 ¡ q0) + ¯[2°(q0 ¡
1)2 ¡ 1]q0 + ®[2(¯ + ° + ²)(q0 ¡ 1)2 ¡ 1]g2. Given that 0 < d < 1 by assumption, we
have paternalism i® 1 > d > ^ dJ(q0) > 0 with J = fT;Lg. ^ dJ(q0) > 0 is the threshold for
paternalism. Moreover, whenever q0 >
°+²
°+¯+², traditional parents are always paternalistic
but liberal parents are paternalistic i® 1 > d > ^ dL(q0) > 0; when q0 <
°+²
°+¯+², liberal parents
are always paternalistic but traditional parents are paternalistic i® 1 > d > ^ dT(q0) > 0.
Assume that ² < ²¤, so that d1 < d2. From Proposition 1 we know that when d > d2 then
q1 ! ¹ qI+ and diversity is ensured in the long-run; when d 2 [d1;d2] then q1 ! 1; when
d < d1 then q1 ! f0;1g respectively for q0 < ¹ qI¡ and q0 > ¹ qI¡. The following di®erent
scenarios are possible, depending on the level of the taste for similarity:
(i) Let d < d1 and q0 < ¹ qI¡, with q0 such that both ¢V T
0 and ¢V L
0 are positive and
paternalism is observed at t = 0. Knowing from Proposition 1 that the dynamics will
converge to ¹ q = 0 in the long-run, the limit of ¢V L
t when t ! 1 is always positive, but
the limit of ¢V T
t when t ! 1 will be positive if and only if d > d1, which is excluded
by assumption. This implies that traditional parents will be non-paternalistic in the long-
run. Given monotonicity, there 9 t < N for which traditional parents aim to protect their
ideological trait in their children. Whenever t ¸ N (with N threshold in time) traditional
parents no longer promote their own trait; they behave in a non paternalistic way. (Assuming
q0 > ¹ qI¡ and q0 such that ¢V T
0 and ¢V L
0 are both positive, implies in the long-run the
presence of non-paternalistic liberal parents but paternalistic traditional parents). This
implies that paternalism at 0 · t < N is not a su±cient condition to have diversity in the
long-run.
(ii) Assume now d 2 [d1;d2] and q0 such that both ¢V T
0 and ¢V L
0 are positive and pa-
ternalism is ensured at t = 0. The long-run dynamics will converge to ¹ q = 1. The limit
of ¢V T
t at t = 1 will be positive, but the limit of ¢V L
t at t = 1 will be positive if and
only if d > d2 which is excluded by assumption. In this case liberal parents will be non
paternalistic in the long-run even if they are paternalistic at t = 0.
(iii) Assume d > d2. Given the parameters' domain we know that d2 > ^ dJ(q0) so that
d > ^ dJ(q0) with j = fT;Lg 8 q0 2 [0;1]. This implies that both ¢V T
t and ¢V L
t are positive
in every period of time. As we know from Proposition 1, the long-run dynamics will converge
to the internal solution ¹ qI+ in which diversity is observed. The limit of ¢V T
t and ¢V L
t when
25t ! 1 will be positive given the assumptions on the parameters. This means that when the
taste for similarity is su±ciently high parents will be paternalistic in every period. Since
paternalism is monotonic in q, we conclude that paternalism at 0 · t < N is a necessary
condition to have diversity in the long-run.
The same proof can be applied to the other scenarios: ² > ²¤ and ² = ²¤.
Proof of Proposition 4
First of all we have to observe that both the dynamics under perfect foresight (11) and
under myopic foresight (12) are monotonic, because both functions are continuous and non-
decreasing. Solving equation (12) at the steady state we ¯nd the same equilibria as with the
model with perfect foresight. Taking the limit of the dynamic equation (12) when q ! 0, we
observe that if d <
°+²
®+° the dynamic converges to zero passing below the 45 line. Conversely,
when d >
°+²
®+° the dynamic converges to zero passing above the 45 line. Proceeding as in
Proof 1 it is straightforward to show that the dynamics under myopic foresight presents the
same qualitative structure as the dynamics under perfect foresight, in the sense that the
steady states are the same and the ¯rst-order stability conditions are equivalent.
We want to prove that the dynamics under perfect foresight (PF) exhibit a higher speed
of convergence than those under myopic foresight (MF). To this end we have to show that
the ratio between the speed of convergence under PF and MF is greater than one, that is,
^ ¾ = ¾
PF





¹ q ¡ qi
t
with i = fPF;MFg
Substituting the steady state values and the dynamics (11) and (12) (respectively for i =
fPF;MFg) into the equation above, then, 8 qt 2 [0;1], we obtain ^ ¾ = f1¡(qt ¡1)qt[d(° ¡
1) ¡ (² + ¯) + d(¯ + ² ¡ °)qt]g¡1. Given the parameters' domain it is straightforward to
demonstrate that ^ ¾ = ¾
PF
¾MF > 1 8 qt¸0.
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